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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at analyzing the effects of corruption on investment and growth in 15 Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries during the period 1985-2013. We used the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index and we conducted a panel 
cointegration analysis and Granger causality procedure to detect the dynamic relationships 
between the variables. The main findings of this paper show that corruption is a serious hurdle 
to economic growth in MENA countries since it affects investment activities and foreign 
direct investment inflows. In this case, policymakers have to implement effective anti-
corruption strategies to avoid the epidemic of corruption. 
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1. Introduction  
It is commonly acknowledged by economists and international organizations that corruption 
remains one of the prevalent challenges to our modern society. Corruption hinder growth and 
prosperity by distorting business activity, reduce investment, dampen the intended effect of 
policies and hinder the functioning of institutions (Sequeira 2012).  Since the nineties a huge 
amount of theoretical and empirical papers have been carried out to examine the origin of 
corruption, its determinants, its consequences, and the effective  anti-corruption strategies that 
could stop its widespread. The topic was firstly analyzed by the seminal work of Leff (1964) 
who opined the close linkage between corruption and economic growth. Since that, a huge 
amount of papers have been carried out to test the determinants and the reel effects of 
corruption for different countries by the use of different econometric procedures (OLS, 2SLS, 
ECM, VAR, PVAR, VECM, PVECM etc.). Despite the vast amount of studies, the empirical 
findings provide conflicting results. In fact, while corruption appears to affect growth for 
some countries (Del Monte and Papagni (2001), Akai et al (2005). Ajie and Wokekoro 
(2012), Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012), Donga and Torgler (2013), Beekman et al (2014)) it 
does not have any effects for other countries.  Some researches show that corruption could 
even be profitable for growth (Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), and Friedrich (1972) Hines 
(1995),).  
Literature has used various indices for measuring corruption. The most used are Business 
International (BI), the Transparency International index (TI) and the International Country 
Risk Guide (IRCG). BI published indices on 56 “country risk” factors for 68 countries, for the 
period 1980-1983, and on 30 country risk factors for 57 countries, for the period 1971-1979. 
The BI indices are between 0 and 10 and a high value of the index means that the country in 
has “good” institutions. The corruption perception index (CPI) provided by International 
Transparency (IT) ranks countries according to the extent by which corruption is believed to 
exist. It was created in 1995 by Transparency International and includes almost 200 countries 
on a scale of zero to 10, with zero indicating high levels of corruption and 10 indicating low 
levels. Since 2012, the scale of CPI varies between 0 and 100. Developed countries typically 
rank higher than developing nations due to stronger regulations.  The ICRG index rates 140 
countries each month on the basis of over 40 risk metrics affecting political, economic 
and financial risk, dating back to 1984 for most. The ICRG corruption index varies from 0 to 
6, with higher values indicating higher corruption.   
Despite the existence of various studies on the relationship between corruption and growth, 
the topic remains till this day on the timetable of the scholars, international organizations and 
policy makers. Hence, in this paper we aim at studying the dynamic relationship between 
corruption and growth in Middle East and North Africa (MENA henceforth) region. The 
selected region is an interesting case study for various reasons. First, almost all MENA 
countries have liberalized their economies in the nineties, ratified most of the international 
agreements (GATT, Free Trade Agreement, WTO, etc.) and increased their partnerships with 
numerous western countries. Consequently, several MENA countries have seen their role in 
the global economy as investors and trade partners improved and they became a major player 
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in the global capital markets with their powerful sovereign funds and exchange reserves 
(Hamdi and Sbia 2013). Second, MENA countries have witnessed buoyant economic growth 
during the past few years with the average growth rate in the last ten years (4.7% during 
2002-2012). Furthermore, many of the MENA countries have become a center for 
international business and investment and many countries have experienced massive inflows 
of foreign capital for investment such as Tunisia, Morocco and the GCC countries. FDI has 
dramatically increased in the MENA with the inflows increasing by 6 times from 1990 to 
2000 and by 12 times from 2000 to 2010 (Ernst &Young 2013). This in turn have boosted the 
economic activities and created employment. Third most of the countries have similar 
socioeconomic characteristics and this make the comparative analysis more effective. Fourth, 
since the seventies, the MENA region has been the subject of a large literature on oil and 
energy sector, banks and financial market, trade and economic growth. However, to the best 
of our knowledge, comprehensive studies on corruption are very limited. In was argued in 
recent literature by international organizations that corruption in the Arab world in general 
and in the MENA region in particular is one of the main fundamental causes of the social 
upheavals that happen since 2010. Corruption was epidemic in the different sectors of the 
economy in particular in the political sector. According to an investigation of Transparency 
International (2010), 36 % of the Arabs had to pay repeatedly bribes to public state 
employees.  
For all these reasons we are aiming in this paper at analyzing the concept of corruption, 
causes and consequences on FDI and Growth in selected MENA countries.  In the empirical 
section we use data which covers the period 1985 to 2013. While most of the previous studies 
have employed GMM and OLS techniques, we opt for the present study a Panel vector error 
correction model and cointegartion technique to detect causality between the variables used in 
the model. Using PVECM is very useful in case of a multivariate framework as it helps 
investigating the dynamic relationship between the different variables. Beyond economic 
growth (proxied by GDP per capita) and corruption (measured by ICRG index) we include in 
the econometric model: foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI), domestic 
investment as a percentage of GDP (Inves) and total credit to the private sector (CPS). 
Therefore, the use of PVECM will provide more than one conclusion that GMM and other 
panel data techniques cannot provide.  
The main findings of this paper show that corruption is a serious hinder of economic growth 
in MENA countries and some serious policy actions have to be done to stop the widespread of 
corruption.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief recent literature review, 
section 3 gives a glance at the propagation of corruption in MENA countries, section 4 
provides the methodology, section 5 gives the empirical results and finding while section 6 
concludes.   
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2. Corruption, FDI and Growth: A brief recent literature review  
Broadly, literature on the economic and social consequences of corruption on growth is vast. 
The first academic articles were published in late 60s by the pioneering works of Leff (1964), 
Myrdal (1968) and Huntington (1968) and later by North’s (1990, 1994), Mauro (1995) and 
Bardhan (1997). 
During the past recent years, the topic has received a great deal of attention by policymakers, 
governments and scholars as well. This shows the importance of corruption which is 
considered as the main impediment to growth especially for less developed countries. Despite 
the conflicting results of the impacts of corruption on growth in developed countries, most of 
the recent papers have argued that corruption hampers economic development and then 
recommended a quick policy actions and reforms to fight its widespread. However, some 
other researches support the idea that corruption does not have potential effects on growth but 
it could even be profitable for economic development. For example, Akcay (2001) conducted 
an empirical study to test the consequences of the level of corruption on FDI inflows for a 
sample of 52 developing countries. In his research, he employed two different indices of 
corruption and conducted an OLS regression with region dummies. Surprisingly, the results 
reveal that corruption is not found to be an obstacle to growth in the sample. He argued that 
the market size, corporate tax rates, labor costs and the openness of the economy are the main 
determinants for FDI inflows. In a similar study by Evrensel (2010), he examined the 
relationship between corruption-growth nexus using a sample of 121 developed and 
developing countries.  His model found that only corruption controls the relationship between 
the governance-related variables and growth rates and government effectiveness significantly 
and adversely affect the average growth rate. Regarding the relationship between growth 
volatility and governance-related variables, the results suggest that higher corruption control, 
expropriation risk control, government effectiveness, and government consumption decrease 
growth volatility.   
In another finding, Mutaşcu (2010) conducted a study to examine the relationship between 
corruption and political, administrative and economic determinants factors for a panel of 27 
European countries observed during the period 1996-2008. Using a regressive pool data 
model, the results reveal that corruption has a significant negative impact on the human well-
being (measured by the Human Development Index).  
The study of Azam et al (2013) uses a sample of 33 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
observed over the period 1985-2011 to test whether corruption affect FDI or not. Using a 
panel data methodology they found that the level of FDI inflows in LDCs is influenced by the 
level of corruption, market size and inflation rate. In another type of study, Saha and Gounder 
(2013) examined the relationship between income and corruption using recent data covering 
100 countries and by regions and income classification for the period 1995 to 2008. To 
explore the non-linear relationship, they performed linear, quadratic and cubic models. Their 
results indicate a negative relationship between income and corruption. 
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Castro and Nunes. (2013) analyzed the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 73 countries 
during the period 1998-2008. Empirical findings based on the fixed effect GLS regression 
indicate that countries with a lower level of corruption have the greater FDI inflows. Results 
indicate also that controlling corruption may be considered as determinant to increase the 
level of FDI inflows. On the other hand, Okada and Samreth (2014) tested the effect of 
foreign direct investment on economic growth. They have used a sample of 130 countries 
from 1995 to 2008. Empirical results indicate that FDI alone does not spur economic growth. 
However, its effect is significant if the interaction term between FDI and corruption is 
considered. FDI has a positive impact on economic growth when corruption is severe, but a 
negative impact if corruption is below a certain level. 
Based on a sample of 60 non-OECD countries over the period 1985–2002, Delgado et al 
(2014), have investigated initially the effect of FDI on the economic growth and especially 
haw can this impact varies with the level of corruption. Secondly, they have analyzed the 
corruption- growth linkage. To this end, they used a semi-parametric model which is able to 
detect haw corruption can impacts simultaneously the level of FDI and the economic growth. 
The empirical result of this research reveals that corruption exerts nonlinear effect on the FDI-
growth relation, weakening the effectiveness of FDI at improving growth rates in many 
developing countries.   
In the Asian context, Quazi (2014) has used the GLS panel data methodology to analyze the 
effect of corruption on FDI inflows in East Asia and South Asia during the period 1995-2011. 
The findings indicate that corruption impacts significantly negatively the level of FDI. 
Turning now to the African continent; Quazi et al.(2014) have used a dataset of 53 African 
countries over the period 1995-2012 to analyze the impact of corruption on FDI inflows. They 
conducted the dynamic System Generalized Method of Moments modeling framework.  
Empirical results indicate that corruption facilitates FDI inflows in Africa. Findings indicate 
also that the level of FDI is significantly affected by market size, government effectiveness, 
infrastructure, and economic freedom. For the same African continent, Onyinye (2014) have 
used a sample of Sub-Saharan African Countries during the period 2005-2011 to investigate 
the relation between corruption and FDI. The OLS regression indicates that there is a negative 
but not significant correlation between FDI and the level of corruption. Also, gross capital 
formation does not play a major role in attracting FDI. In contrary, the GDP growth is 
considered as more relevant in attracting FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
3. Corruption, FDI and Growth in the MENA region 
During the past few years, many MENA countries have experienced social upsurges and 
demonstrations against their government. Generally speaking, an explosive mix of socio-
economic problems and widespread and deepening political grievances constituted a common 
causal thread behind all the uprisings (Dalacoura 2012). Corruption was among the main 
reasons that pushed people to protest during the period 2010-2011 as it was endemic and 
exaggerated in these MENA countries. In fact, households have to pay money to get 
whatsoever from the public sector. This situation vexed people and hence unprecedented 
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demonstrations were recorded in most Arab countries which in turn forced some governments 
including Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen to recede and to leave the political scene. Some 
other upsurges end to dramatic conflicts and even to civil war such as the case for Syria.  
The investigation of Transparency International in 2010 reveals that 36 % of the Arabs had to 
pay repeatedly bribes to public state employees. More recently, Transparency international 
(2012) studies the causes of corruption in five countries of the MENA1 region, shows that the 
contextual factors such as the insecurity and the oil wealth and the institutional factors are the 
most determinants of corruption in these countries. The report of Revenue Watch (2011) 
indicates that the oil income feeds the corruption and weak the public institutions. Numerous 
other publications showed that the oil wealth in the MENA countries often go in parallel with 
losses of liberty, polarization of the disparities. (Dunning.2007, Di John, 2007 and Schwarz, 
2008). 
The level of corruption in the MENA countries can be explained also by the poor governance 
in this region. The quantitative picture reveals a gradation in the quality of governance in 
MENA.  Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) aims to measure the quality of governance 
in a particular nation using six metrics: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. An 
examination of the evolution of the level of those indicators reveals that almost all the MENA 
countries recorded negative scores. According to the WGI indicators, especially the control of 
corruption, nine countries of fifteen have recorded negative scores. For example, the control 
of corruption score for Algeria crossed from -0,47 in 1996 to reach -0,53 in 2012. Also, Egypt 
recorded negative value during the period 1996-2012. The control corruption score was -0,06 
in 1996 to become -0,57 in 2012. Iran and Syria are the two countries which have the weakest 
score. Iran have registered a score of -0,99 in 2010 and -0,92 in 2011. This score was about -
0,64 in 1996. Contrary to Iran and Syria, Tunisia and Turkey have recorded the highest score 
for controlling corruption although that those scores appear negative. The control corruption 
score for Tunisia crossed from -0.22 in 1996 to reach -0,18 in 2012. 
For the second index of governance relative to the voice and accountability, fourteen of 
fifteen countires of our study recorded negative scores. Only Cyprus registered positive values 
which crossed from 1, 03 in 1996 to reach 1,00 in 2012. Consequently, we can consider this 
index as the weakest component of governance indicators in the MENA countries. For the 
index of rule of law, we can consider it as respected on average. Only five countries of fifteen 
have recorded negative scores. Those countires are Algeria, Iran, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
Similarly to the index of rule of law, only six countries recorded negative values when the 
index is the government effectiveness. Finally, when we analyze the political stability and 
absence of violence or terrorism, we find that nine of the fifteen observed countries have 
registered negative scores en average during the period 1996-2012. This political instability 
can be considered as a favourable ground to the spread of corruption.  
                                               
1
 Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia.  
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The recent report of Transparency International (2013) indicates that 84 % of 17 countries of 
the MENA region (all except the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) obtained a score lower 
than 50, on a scale varying 0 in 100, where The index from varies 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (not 
corrupted. Among 17 countries of the MENA region, only five of them saw their rank 
improving over one year  where Algeria realized the best improvement (+11), followed by 
Egypt  (+4) and Saudi Arabia (+3). Syria registered the largest drop (-24 notches) followed by 
Libya (-12) and Yemen (-11). The deterioration of situation in Libya and Syria are the main 
reason explaining this drop. 
For Tunisia, Transparency International (2013) and the World justice project and the Rule of 
law index (2013), show that the level of corruption increased during the last decade. The 
country moved from the rank 33rd in 1998 to 73rd among 183 countries in 2011 and 77th 
among 177 countries in 2013. This shows that the level of corruption in Tunisia increased 
during this period2.  An examination of the most corrupted sectors in Tunisia reveals that the 
police sector is the most corrupted with a level of 51%, followed by the parliament members 
and the State employees of the national government with a level of 32%. In the last rank, we 
find Judges and magistrates with 30%. 
The report of Transparency international (2013) indicates that Egypt is ranked 114th out of 
177 in the Corruption Perceptions Index but it reveals Egypt’s score saw no change from 
2012. According to the global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Libya is ranked 172th over 
177 countries (Transparency International.2013) while Algeria is ranked 94th and Morocco 
91th. 
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC henceforth) countries, the UAE and Saudi are the 
only countries that improved their ranking. Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2013, ranked the UAE 26th, Qatar 28th Bahrain 57th Oman 61st, Saudi 
Arabia 63rd and Kuwait 69th. Conflict-wracked countries like Syria and Yemen significantly 
declined to the bottom of the world ranks for perceived levels of corruption, with rankings of 
168 and 167 respectively. 
Figure 1 below indicates the evolution of the level of corruption in 15 MENA countries 
during the period 1985-2013. Values used in Figure 1 are calculated in term of mean during 
the period 1985-2013. We have used the ICRG index to analyze the evolution of the level of 
corruption in 15 MENA countries. We did not use the CPI for two reasons. First, the CPI’ 
indexes for Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and UAE are available since 2003. Data for the other countries are 
collected since 1998. Second, the CPI Index methodology changed in 2012 from a scale of 0 
to 10 (0 highest perceived corruption, 10 highest perceived probity), to a scale of 0 to 100.  
 
                                               
2
 The situation get worsened  after the so called “Jasmin revolution” of December 2010 as the corruption 
perception index moved from 3.8 in 2011 to 2.8 in 2012 and 1.9 for 2013.  
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As it is shown is Figure 1, the level of corruption is not constant over the time. We can even 
see five different trajectories. The first one is observed during the period 1985-1991 where the 
average level of corruption was constant and globally weak. The average level of corruption 
moved from 2.73 in 1985 to 2.67 in 1991. In the second phase, we see an upward trend of the 
average level of corruption during period 1992-1996. The mean value of the ICRG shifted 
from 3.03 in 1992 to 3.10 in 1996. Compared to the total period of study 1985-2013, the level 
of corruption during the second period is the highest in the MENA region. The third phase 
spreads out from 1997 to 2000. From 1997, we notice a decrease of the level of corruption for 
the MENA countries. The mean value of the ICRG moved from 2.93 in 1997 to 2.60 in 2000. 
During the fourth phase, the average level of corruption gets back to its constant level. It 
moved from 2.27 in 2001 to 2.43 in 2009. This period is considered as the least corrupted 
phase. From 2010, the level of corruption begins to take a rising trend. The mean value of the 
ICRG moved from 2.27 in 2001 to 2.36 in 2010 and 2.57 in 2013. 
Figure1.  The evolution of the level of corruption in 15 MENA countries 
 
Source: Authors from the ICRG reports 
Turning now to the level of FDI inflows and economic growth in the MENA countries, Figure 
2 shows a comparative figure of the two variables in 15 MENA countries. The values are 
expressed in mean during the period 1985-2013.  
 
Figure2: FDI inflows and GDP growth in 15 selected MENA countries 
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Source: Authors from the World Bank Indicators (WDI) 
Figure 2 shows that Qatar has the highest average GDP growth rate (6,592%) during the 
period of the study followed by Kuwait (5,376%) Bahrain (4,782 %) while Algeria recorded 
the lowest rate (0,506 %).  Regarding FDI inflows, Figure 2 shows that Bahrain is ranked in 
the top list with a ratio of FDI inflows to GDP equal to 5,805 followed by Jordan (4,929%) 
and Cyprus (4,759%). Algeria and Iran have recorded weak FDI inflows as their ratios were 
0,913% and 0,548% respectively. Finally, Kuwait appears in the last rank with a value of 
0,246%.  
Based on these statistics and data explained above, we can think about three possible 
assumptions: 
1.  Countries with a high level of corruption are characterized by a weak GDP growth and 
FDI inflows. Algeria is the best example. 
2.  Countries with a weak level of corruption are characterized by a high rate of GDP 
growth and FDI inflows, as for example in Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Cyprus.  
3.  Countries with a low ratio of FDI inflow do not know necessary a weak rate of GDP 
growth. This relation is in particular evident for the some GCC countries such as Kuwait 
and UAE. 
In the next section we will try to get an empirical explanation of the most plausible and 
feasible scenario in the MENA region.  
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4. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data  
The data used in this paper cover the period 1985 to 2013 for fifteen Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA henceforth) countries including: Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and United 
Arab Emirates. The dependent variable is economic growth proxied by per capita gross 
domestic product (GDPpc) and the independent variables are as follows: Foreign direct 
investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI), domestic investment as a percentage of GDP 
(Inves) and total credit to the private sector (CPS). These variables were obtained from the 
World Bank’s Statistics Database. Regarding corruption, it is an index that varies from 0 to 6, 
where lower value implies higher corruption. Data on corruption was extracted from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
 
Table-1 exposes the results of descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. The results show 
that on average, FDI is negative while the other variables are positive. As a first glance, this 
figure is not promising as it could indicate the low contribution of FDI to economic growth.  
However, the correlation matrix reveals the existence of a positive relationship between FDI 
and GDP while negative relationships exist between FDI and investment along with the per 
capita real GDP. It is worth mentioning that the coefficients between all the variables are low 
which reflect absence of autocorrelation between the variables of the study.  
 
Table-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 LGDPPC LFDI LCPS LINVES LCOR 
 Mean  1.2549 -0.1287  3.6038  3.0670  0.9519 
 Median  1.4747  0.1397  3.6071  3.0779  0.9808 
 Maximum  3.5260  3.5136  5.8501  3.9125  1.6094 
 Minimum -3.5065 -4.6051  1.3635  1.9740  0.4054 
 Std. Dev.  0.9888  1.6720  0.7540  0.2923  0.2752 
 Observations  433  433  433  433  433 
 LGDPPC LFDI LCPS LINVES LCOR 
LGDPPC 1     
LFDI 0.0108 1    
LCPS -0.0338 0.2524 1   
LINVES -0.0093 0.1585 -0.1210 1  
LCOR 0.0272 -0.0746 0.3560 -0.1313 1 
Note. LGDPpc is the real GDP per capita; LINV is the ratio of investment to GDP, LCPS is the credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP, LCOR, the corruption index, LFDI is the foreign direct investment inflows as a 
percentage of GDP, L is the logarithm. All the variables are expressed into log form to reduce the problem of 
heteroscedasticity.   
 
4.2. Econometric approach  
The purpose of this research paper is to investigate the existence of a long-run and short-run 
relationship between corruption and growth for the case of MENA countries. To this end, the 
empirical methodology will be presented in multiple stages. First of all, we have to test for 
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stationarity of all the variables using Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC, 2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 
2003), the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (F-ADF), Philips–Perron (PP, 1998) and finally 
Breitung (2000). The PURT will then be followed by various tests to identify the existence of 
panel cointegration relationship. Finally, in case we found that all the variables are integrated 
of order one I(1) and cointegrated, we conduct a panel vector error correction model (VECM) 
technique suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) to determine the short-run elasticities. In 
our multivariate framework, PVECM will help detecting the dynamic relationship between 
the different variables of this study. Hence, we could expect to have more than one result.    
The Framework of the PVECM is specified as follows: 
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Where itε  are the serially uncorrelated random error terms. The 1−tect  is the cointegrating 
vectors and iθ  is the adjustment coefficient indicating the weight of adjusted disequilibrium 
in the past. To get a long-run relationship among the variables the coefficient of iθ  should be 
negative and statistically significant.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Panel Unit roots and Panel Cointegration tests 
We employ the Levin and Chu test, (LLC, 2002), the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003)) test, 
the Fisher-Type test by ADF and PP-test and finally Breitung (2000) test to check for the 
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stationarity of the variables. The results are presented in Table 2. They show that the test 
statistics for the log levels of LGDP, LFDI, LCPS, LINV and LCOR are statistically 
insignificant. When we apply the panel unit root tests to the first difference of the five 
variables, all four tests reject the joint null hypothesis for each variable at the 5 per cent level. 
Accordingly, from all of the tests, the panel unit roots tests indicate that each variable is 
integrated of order one (I(1)).  
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Test 
Method LGDPpc LFDI LCPS LINVES LCOR 
Level First Level First Level First Level First Level First 
LLC  10.412 
-
8.7280  0.0443 -3.7664 -0.3836 -5.1806  2.8225 -8.6397 -0.3597 -6.8212 
  
  ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
IPS -0.7493 
-
14.412 -0.7095 -10.989 -0.8193 -6.2927 -1.1979 -9.9431 -0.5834 -6.8383 
  
  ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
ADF  24.779  212.23  30.136  159.97  41.076  96.148  34.390  143.78  36.931  98.522 
  
  ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
PP   197.00  2680.7  11.325  921.89  14.4642  193.608  70.8069  588.135  46.2656  204.777 
  
  ***   ***   ***   ***   *** 
Breitung  2.12742 
-
6.1815 
-
1.19106 
-
8.93874  0.56170 
-
2.23376 
-
0.30567 
-
8.96660  0.22938 
-
8.28863 
  
  ***   ***   **   ***   *** 
Note: The numbers represent p-values  
Note: ** and *** denote significance of coefficients at 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
 
The second step of our empirical procedure is to test for the existence of the panel 
cointegration between GDP and the other explanatory variables for balanced MENA Panel 
data by the mean of Pedroni (1999) tests.  The test results are exposed in table 3; they reveal 
the rejections of the null of no cointegration for all tests at 1 % level of significance except 
Panel v-test. Therefore, we can confirm that our model is panel cointegrated. This result is 
supported by the Kao (1999) test as it is significant at 1% level of significance suggesting 
panel cointegration relationship among GDP and its determinants for MENA countries. 
5.1.1.  Panel cointegration test 
 
Table 3. Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
  Weighted  Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -1.358398  0.9128 
Panel rho-Statistic -2.984684  0.0014** 
Panel PP-Statistic -10.61705    0.0000*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.170289    0.0000*** 
  Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic -1.989357  0.0233** 
Group PP-Statistic -16.26547    0.0000*** 
Group ADF-Statistic -3.319524    0.0005*** 
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Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
ADF -2.628075***  0.0043 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test  
Hypothesized Trace Test  Max-Eigen test 
None  200.1***  129.4*** 
At most 1  95.06***  77.12*** 
At most 2  40.90  32.62 
At most 3  26.82  21.13 
At most 4  41.47  41.47 
Note: The optimal lag lengths are selected using SBC. 
Trace test and Max-eigenvalue test indicate 1cointegrating vector at the 0.01 level. 
*** Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%level of significance. 
The result of Johansen Fisher test shows the existence two cointegrating vectors at 1% of 
significance.   
5.2. Panel Long run and short run 
As we find evidence of a cointegration relationship between the variables of our model, 
hence, an at least one long-run equilibrium must exist and Granger causality should also exists 
among these variables in at least one way (Engle and Granger, 1987). To examine these 
procedures, we start the analysis by performing a Panel vector error correction methodology 
(PVECM) to allow us getting the long-run and short-run results.  
 
5.2.1. Long-run estimation  
 
The outputs of the long-run equilibrium estimation are revealed in Table 4. They show that 
the coefficient of corruption is positive (0.557) and it exert a statistically positives effects on 
per capita GDP at the level of 1%. It is worth recalling that the positive sign reveals the 
negative impact on growth. In our case, an increase in the level of corruption (index) is 
followed with a decrease in per capita GDP growth rate of 0.557.percentage points.  This 
result is in line with most of the studies on corruption and growth nexus. 
 
The variable credit to the private sector (CPS) is positive as expected but it does not exert a 
statistically significant effect on real per capita GDP. The level of credit to the private sector 
appears to be insufficient in MENA countries and this conclusion could be of great interest for 
policy makers to boost up credits which will in turn accelerate investment activities and 
hence, growth.  
 
Regarding the others variables. The results of Table 3 also show that the coefficient of 
investment and FDI are negative (-0.843 and -0.959 respectively) and significant at the level 
of 5%. This unexpected result shows that the low level of FDI inflows in MENA region and 
the weak investment activities. Unfortunately, MENA region appears to have the incapacity to 
attract massive FDI inflows in the late nineties. From 2001 to 2003, the UNCTAD inward 
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FDI performance index shows that the MENA is far behind any other developing region 
except South-Asia (UNCTAD, 2004). In this sense, it is worth recalling that MENA although 
countries have many similar socioeconomic characteristics they also have similar factors that 
hampered FDI inflows since the seventies and eighties. According to Eid and Paua, (2003) 
FDI flows to MENA countries have been meager and unevenly distributed and some 
socioeconomic and political factors explain this disparity. These factors include political 
instability, restriction of FDI to a few sectors, preventing a majority ownership to foreigners 
and requiring a local partner in a joint venture and a relatively slow pace of privatization. All 
these factors have impacted negatively economic growth and development. Therefore, a lot of 
efforts have to be done to attract more FDI and to encourage foreign investors doing business 
in MENA region.  
To conclude, in a corrupted environment, one should expect that investment activity is feeble 
and the overall economic performance is weak.  
 
Table 4. Long run elasticities  
  Coef. T-value 
LFDI - 0.09 1.791** 
LCPS   0.039    -0.163 
LINVES - 0.643 1.554** 
LCOR   0.557  -0.157*** 
C  -2.025 
Note*** and ** denote significance of coefficients at 1% and 5%   level of significance respectively. 
 
The output of the short-run estimation is reported in Table 4.  The variables are presented with 
two lags as the optimal lag length was two according to the sequential modified LR test 
statistic (LR), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) lag selection 
criteria. First of all, it is relevant to show that the error correction term, having the right sign, 
is statistically significant at the level of 5%. The coefficient of the ECT is -0.65 suggesting 
that when per capita GDP is above or below its equilibrium level, it adjusts by almost 65% 
within the first year. Thus, the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is not enough fast in 
case of any shock to emission equation.  
 
Turning now to the signs of the variables, it is shown that the coefficient of credit to the 
private sector is negative but significant. Hence, if we consider CPS as an indicator of 
financial development, then our finding cannot support finance-led-growth hypothesis in 
MENA countries in the short-run. Policymakers should further improve the credit condition 
and the market for credits to facilitate access to finance and accelerate economic growth in the 
short-run. This could be done by encouraging the development of the interbank market and 
open market operations to allow the refinancing of short and medium-term projects and to 
enable the availability of  liquidity and to avoid the inefficiencies of direct controls (Hamdi et 
al. 2014). 
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Another important result is the sign of FDI which became positive and significant at 5% level. 
This change is mainly due to the fact that the positive impact of FDI in economic growth has 
received a great deal of attention by policy makers in numerous countries in MENA region. In 
fact, following the period of the post-oil chocks, several MENA countries have adopted major 
structural and institutional reforms to attract FDI and to boost up their economies through 
investment activities. They also make various steps to make their environments more business 
friendly and more attractive for international investors. Some countries like Tunisia, Algeria 
and Morocco have quickly adopted the Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) as suggested 
by the IMF and the World Bank to accelerate growth and to integrate the world economy. As 
a result, the FDI began rising continuously for several years but the FDI’s distribution has 
been uneven. Overall, the growth in their FDI inflows in MENA countries was reached an 
outstanding level in 2009 as it moved from 0.77% of the total inflows in 1990 to 8% in 2009. 
It seems that the adopted reforms have had a positive impact on the level of growth in the 
MENA region as a whole. 
 
Regarding the other variables, they have the same results like the long-run estimations  
 
Table 5. Short-run estimation 
Regressors Coef t-stat  
D(LFDI(-1)) 0.12 2.48056** 
D(LFDI(-2)) 0.17 3.44373*** 
D(LCPS(-1)) -0.706 -2.43508** 
D(LCPS(-2)) -0.045 -0.14754 
     D(LINVES(-1)) -0.142 -0.50652 
     D(LINVES(-2)) -0.055 -0.20238 
 D(LCOR(-1))  0.465 1.99077* 
 D(LCOR(-2)) -0.188 -0.47487 
                      C -0.035 -0.68870 
ECT -0.651 -8.45509*** 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
 
As we found a panel long-run cointegration relationship among LGDP, LFDI, LCPS, LINV 
and LCOR, hence Granger causality should exist in at least one direction between as least two 
variables. Thus, the next stage is to examine the direction of causality amongst these 
variables. 
 
5.2.2. Granger causality tests  
 
The results of causality tests based on the PVEC model are reported in Table 6. The table has 
three major blocks illustrating the short-run effects, long-run effects represented by the error 
correction coefficients, and the joint short-run and long run effects, respectively. 
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Table 6. Results of causality tests based on VECM. 
Variables Short run (F-stats) ECT Joint short and long run (F-stats) 
∆LGDP ∆LFDI ∆LINV ∆LCPS ∆LCOR  ∆LGDP& 
ECT 
∆LFDI& 
ECT 
∆LINV 
ECT 
∆LCPS 
& ECT 
∆LCOR& 
ECT 
∆LGDP - 5.002 
*** 
1.291 
 
3.437 
** 
3.667 
*** 
-0.653 
*** - 
27.648 
*** 
24.858 
*** 
27.035 
*** 
23.835 
*** 
∆LFDI 0.514 - 
2.636 
** 0.361 
-0.215 
*** 0.586 - 2.196* 0.853 
∆LINV 0.718 0.730 - 0.957 1.679* 
-0.007 
*** 
2.837 
** 0.922 - 1.047 1.608 
∆LCPS 1.0766 0.372 0.245 - 0.189 0.032** 1.419 1.659 1.489 - 1.475 
∆LCOR 0.4198 0.890 
2.914 
** 0.546 - 0.0079 0.279 0.791 2.177* 0.536 - 
*** Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 6 reveals some significant results. The most important one is the existence of a 
unidirectional Granger causal relationship running from FDI, CPS and COR to GDP. This 
means that FDI is a very important factor for the economy of MENA region. This result is in 
line with the most previous studies (De Mello (1997), Mauro (1995), Borensztein et al. 
(1998), Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Anwar and Sun (2011)).  Similarly, CPS is also 
important as it facilitate investment activities. It is worth recalling that credit condition is one 
of the most important factors of FDI inflow. This result supports the fact that the numerous 
structural reforms and efforts launched by several MENA countries during the past few 
decades were successful to the financial sector and the overall MENA economy.  
Surprisingly, the results show that investment is not a major contributor to economic growth 
in MENA region. This result is in line with the one found in table 5 for the short-run estimates  
 
Table 6 also reveals a bidirectional Granger causal relationship running between corruption 
and Investment. Corruption may deter investment opportunities. In fact, when institutional 
and foreign investors believe corruption is high, they may be discouraged to invest because 
corruption generates additional costs to the investors (King, 2003). In this case one can 
concludes that corruption appears to be a significant hurdle of investment activities and 
prosperity. This result is in line with the results found by Mauro (1997). 
Regarding error correction results, it is found to be negative and significant for all the VECMs 
except in LCOR equation. In this context, LCOR appears to be weakly exogenous.   
Turning now to the right side of table 6, the results of the significance of interactive terms of 
change in all the variables along with the ECT in the GDP equation are consistent with the 
presence of Granger-causality running from LCPS, LFDI, LCOR and LINV, to real per capita 
GDP.   This means that all the variables have positive and significant long-run impacts on the 
level of GDP per capita for the case of MENA countries.  Therefore, corruption is serious 
problem threating short-run and long-run economic growth in MENA region and it should be 
controlled in order to enjoy the full benefits of the structural and institutional reforms.  
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6. Conclusion 
Corruption is perceived to harm economic growth. Based on this conclusion, this paper 
intends to clarify this relationship for a sample of fifteen MENA countries within a 
multivariate framework. Precisely, this study uses a Panel Vector Error Correction Model to 
investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment, corruption and economic 
growth. We also use credit to the private sector and investment as additional variables to 
examine the channels through which corruption could affect growth.  Results showed that per 
capita GDP and the other explanatory variables are non-stationary series but after first 
differencing, the series became stationary and the series are integrated of order I(1). The 
Johansen Cointegration test was used to identify the long-run relationship between the 
variables. 
The results of PVECM model advocate that corruption has a significant influence on per 
capita GDP in the short run and the long run as well. It was also found that lower levels of 
corruption improve the impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth. It is worth 
recalling that the levels of FDI inflows are not equally distributed among MENA countries. In 
fact, while some countries i.e. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and the United 
Arab Emirates received huge amount for FDI inflows, some other countries such as Djibouti 
and Palestinian Territory (West Bank & Gaza), Yemen have been deprived or they received a 
very low FDI inflows. Therefore, the later bloc of countries has to accelerate their structural 
reforms to benefit the numerous added values of foreign investment.  
The major conclusion of the paper is that corruption harms directly and indirectly economic 
growth in MENA region and that strict and serious policy actions should be implemented to 
fight its widespread.  
The major conclusion of the paper is that corruption harms directly and indirectly economic 
growth in MENA region. Despite that our sample covers developed countires, like Qatar, 
Cyprus, Saudi Arabia and UAE, with higher income and with higher governance indicators; 
corruption is seemed to exert negative effect on the economic growth. The main contribution 
of this paper is that corruption acts negatively on the economic growth even in the presence of 
strong indicator of governance such as Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. This result is different from the 
previous when corruption does not exert any effet on growth in countries with high income 
and strong governance.  
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